Nicholas Nathan is University Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool, UK.
The Price of Doubt is an important contribution to the problem of scepticism. It offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. Nicholas Nathan confronts the sceptic. He questions the value of his argument and the knowledge it contains and provides a potential remedy to the frustrations of anti-sceptical epistemology.|
Debates over scepticism are experiencing a strong revival in philosophy - this is a high quality and original contribution
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Acknowledgements, Introduction, I Arguments for ignorance and the negation test, II Demonic arguments, III Regressive arguments, IV Evidence-or-acquaintance arguments, V Anti-idealism, VI Arguments against justified belief, VII From rational action to rational belief, VIII Arguments against rational belief, IX The affirmation test, Appendix: Semantic objections to demonic arguments, Notes, Works cited, Index
This important contribution to the problem of scepticism offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. It questions the value of the sceptic's argument and provides a potential remedy to anti-sceptical epistemology.
Über den Autor
Nicholas Nathan is University Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool, UK.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Acknowledgements, Introduction, I Arguments for ignorance and the negation test, II Demonic arguments, III Regressive arguments, IV Evidence-or-acquaintance arguments, V Anti-idealism, VI Arguments against justified belief, VII From rational action to rational belief, VIII Arguments against rational belief, IX The affirmation test, Appendix: Semantic objections to demonic arguments, Notes, Works cited, Index
Klappentext
The Price of Doubt is an important contribution to the problem of scepticism. It offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. Nicholas Nathan confronts the sceptic. He questions the value of his argument and the knowledge it contains and provides a potential remedy to the frustrations of anti-sceptical epistemology.