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Seeing, Thinking and Knowing
(Englisch)
Meaning and Self-Organisation in Visual Cognition and Thought
Carsetti, A.

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Seeing, Thinking and Knowing

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According to Putnam to talk of "facts” without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing; "object” itself has many uses and as we creatively invent new uses of words "we find that we can speak of `objects´that were not `values of any variable´in 1 any language we previously spoke” . The notion of object becomes, then, like the notion of reference, a sort of open land, an unknown territory. The exploration of this land - pears to be constrained by use and invention. But, we may wonder, is it possible to guide invention and control use? In what way, in particular, is it possible, at the level of na- ral language, to link together program expressions and natural evolution? To give an answer to these onerous questions we should immediately point out that cognition (as well as natural language) has to be considered first of all as a peculiar fu- tion of active biosystems and that it results from complex interactions between the - ganism and its surroundings. "In the moment an organism perceives an object of wh- ever kind, it immediately begins to `interpret´this object in order to react properly to it . . . It is not necessary for the monkey to perceive the tree in itself. . . What counts is sur- 2 vival” .
Acknowledgements. Introduction; A. Carsetti. I: Seeing and thinking: a new approach. Neural models of seeing and thinking; S. Grossberg. Functional architecture of the visual cortex and variational models for Kanizsa's modal subjective contours; J. Petitot. Gestalt theory and computer vision; A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, J.M. Morel. Towards an analytic phenomenology: the concepts of 'bodiliness' and 'grabbiness'; J.K. O'Regan, E. Myin, A. Noë. Internal representations of sensory input reflect the motor output with which organisms respond to the input; A. Di Ferdinando, D. Parisi. Movemes for modeling biological motion perception; L. Goncalves, E. Di Bernardo, P. Perona. Form constraints in motion integration, segmentation and selection; J. Lorenceau. Scintillations, extinctions and other new visual effects; J. Ninio. Commonalities between visual imagery and imagery in other modalities: an investigation by means of FMRI; M. Olivetti Belardinelli, R. Di Matteo, C. Del Gratta, A. De Nicola, A. Ferretti, G.L. Romani. II: Forms and schemes of perceptual and cognitive self-organisation. Microgenesis, immediate experience and visual processes in reading; V. Rosenthal. Language, space and the theory of semantic forms; Y.M. Visetti. Emotion-cognition interaction and language; M. Wimmer. Appearance of structure and emergence of meaning in the visual system; M. Stadler, P. Kruse. The embodied meaning: self-organisation and symbolic dynamics in visual cognition; A. Carsetti. Name index. Subject index.
According to Putnam to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing; "object" itself has many uses and as we creatively invent new uses of words "we find that we can speak of 'objects'that were not 'values of any variable'in 1 any language we previously spoke" . The notion of object becomes, then, like the notion of reference, a sort of open land, an unknown territory. The exploration of this land - pears to be constrained by use and invention. But, we may wonder, is it possible to guide invention and control use? In what way, in particular, is it possible, at the level of na- ral language, to link together program expressions and natural evolution? To give an answer to these onerous questions we should immediately point out that cognition (as well as natural language) has to be considered first of all as a peculiar fu- tion of active biosystems and that it results from complex interactions between the - ganism and its surroundings. "In the moment anorganism perceives an object of wh- ever kind, it immediately begins to 'interpret'this object in order to react properly to it . . . It is not necessary for the monkey to perceive the tree in itself. . . What counts is sur- 2 vival" .
Seeing and Thinking: A New Approach.- Neural Models of Seeing and Thinking.- Functional Architecture of the Visual Cortex and Variational Models for Kanizsa's Modal Subjective Contours.- Gestalt Theory and Computer Vision.- Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness".- Internal Representations of Sensory Input Reflect the Motor Output with Which Organisms Respond to the Input.- Movemes for Modeling Biological Motion Perception.- Form Constraints in Motion Integration, Segmentation and Selection.- Scintillations, Extinctions, and Other New Visual Effects.- Commonalities between Visual Imagery and Imagery in Other Modalities; an Investigation by Means of fMRI.- Forms and Schemes of Perceptual and Cognitive Self-Organisation.- Microgenesis, Immediate Experience and Visual Processes in Reading.- Language, Space and the Theory of Semantic Forms.- Emotion-Cognition Interaction and Language.- Appearance of Structure and Emergence of Meaning in the Visual System.- The Embodied Meaning: Self-Organisation and Symbolic Dynamics in Visual Cognition.

Inhaltsverzeichnis



Acknowledgements. Introduction; A. Carsetti. I: Seeing and thinking: a new approach. Neural models of seeing and thinking; S. Grossberg. Functional architecture of the visual cortex and variational models for Kanizsa's modal subjective contours; J. Petitot. Gestalt theory and computer vision; A. Desolneux, L. Moisan, J.M. Morel. Towards an analytic phenomenology: the concepts of 'bodiliness' and 'grabbiness'; J.K. O'Regan, E. Myin, A. Noë. Internal representations of sensory input reflect the motor output with which organisms respond to the input; A. Di Ferdinando, D. Parisi. Movemes for modeling biological motion perception; L. Goncalves, E. Di Bernardo, P. Perona. Form constraints in motion integration, segmentation and selection; J. Lorenceau. Scintillations, extinctions and other new visual effects; J. Ninio. Commonalities between visual imagery and imagery in other modalities: an investigation by means of FMRI; M. Olivetti Belardinelli, R. Di Matteo, C. Del Gratta, A. De Nicola, A. Ferretti, G.L. Romani. II: Forms and schemes of perceptual and cognitive self-organisation. Microgenesis, immediate experience and visual processes in reading; V. Rosenthal. Language, space and the theory of semantic forms; Y.M. Visetti. Emotion-cognition interaction and language; M. Wimmer. Appearance of structure and emergence of meaning in the visual system; M. Stadler, P. Kruse. The embodied meaning: self-organisation and symbolic dynamics in visual cognition; A. Carsetti. Name index. Subject index.


Klappentext



According to Putnam to talk of ¿facts¿ without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing; ¿object¿ itself has many uses and as we creatively invent new uses of words ¿we find that we can speak of ¿objects¿that were not ¿values of any variable¿in 1 any language we previously spoke¿ . The notion of object becomes, then, like the notion of reference, a sort of open land, an unknown territory. The exploration of this land - pears to be constrained by use and invention. But, we may wonder, is it possible to guide invention and control use? In what way, in particular, is it possible, at the level of na- ral language, to link together program expressions and natural evolution? To give an answer to these onerous questions we should immediately point out that cognition (as well as natural language) has to be considered first of all as a peculiar fu- tion of active biosystems and that it results from complex interactions between the - ganism and its surroundings. ¿In the moment anorganism perceives an object of wh- ever kind, it immediately begins to ¿interpret¿this object in order to react properly to it . . . It is not necessary for the monkey to perceive the tree in itself. . . What counts is sur- 2 vival¿ .




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