Autor/Autorin: Dempsey Liam
Liam P. Dempsey teaches philosophy at Trent University n(Peterborough, Canada). His areas of specialization include nphilosophy of mind and cognitive science, early modern nphilosophy, and the metaphysics and epistemology of immortality nand death.
The mind-body problem is in fact a cluster of closely related problems. The most vexing problems, it would seem, involve conscious experience. What are "qualia,” the variegated raw feels of conscious experiences? Do they take part in the causal goings-on of the physical world? Do they make a difference? And if so, can we give a scientifically plausible account of their causal relevance? It is my contention that qualia are neurophysiological properties of the organisms that have them. Not only elegant and parsimonious, such an account provides for a straightforward explanation of the causal efficacy of conscious experiences. If qualia are neurophysiological properties of the central nervous system, their place in the dynamical economy of the living organism—and thus the natural world—is apparent and unproblematic. However, the identity thesis faces a number of substantive objections and it is the aim of this book to evaluate its prospects in the face of these challenges.
The mind-body problem is in fact a cluster of
closely related problems. The most vexing problems,
it would seem, involve conscious experience. What
are qualia, the variegated raw feels of conscious
experiences? Do they take part in the causal goings-
on of the physical world? Do they make a difference?
And if so, can we give a scientifically plausible
account of their causal relevance? It is my
contention that qualia are neurophysiological
properties of the organisms that have them. Not only
elegant and parsimonious, such an account provides
for a straightforward explanation of the causal
efficacy of conscious experiences. If qualia are
neurophysiological properties of the central nervous
system, their place in the dynamical economy of the
living organism and thus the natural world is
apparent and unproblematic. However, the identity
thesis faces a number of substantive objections and
it is the aim of this book to evaluate its prospects
in the face of these challenges.
Liam P. Dempsey teaches philosophy at Trent University
(Peterborough, Canada). His areas of specialization include
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, early modern
philosophy, and the metaphysics and epistemology of immortality
and death.
Über den Autor
Liam P. Dempsey teaches philosophy at Trent University (Peterborough, Canada). His areas of specialization include philosophy of mind and cognitive science, early modern philosophy, and the metaphysics and epistemology of immortality and death.
Klappentext
The mind-body problem is in fact a cluster of closely related problems. The most vexing problems, it would seem, involve conscious experience. What are "qualia," the variegated raw feels of conscious experiences? Do they take part in the causal goings-on of the physical world? Do they make a difference? And if so, can we give a scientifically plausible account of their causal relevance? It is my contention that qualia are neurophysiological properties of the organisms that have them. Not only elegant and parsimonious, such an account provides for a straightforward explanation of the causal efficacy of conscious experiences. If qualia are neurophysiological properties of the central nervous system, their place in the dynamical economy of the living organism-and thus the natural world-is apparent and unproblematic. However, the identity thesis faces a number of substantive objections and it is the aim of this book to evaluate its prospects in the face of these challenges.
