Über den Autor
Joseph E. Harrington
PART 1 Constructing A Game.- 1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning 1.1 Introduction 1.2 A Sampling of Strategic Situations 1.3 Whetting Your Appetite: The Game of Concentration 1.4 Psychological Profile of a Player 1.5 Playing the Gender Pronoun Game .- 2. Building a Model of a Strategic Situation 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Extensive Form Games: Perfect Information 2.3 Extensive Form Games: Imperfect Information 2.4 What Is a Strategy? 2.5 Strategic Form Games 2.6 Moving from the Extensive Form and Strategic Form 2.7 Going from the Strategic Form to the Extensive Form 2.8 Common Knowledge 2.9 A Few More Issues in Modeling Games .- PART 2 Strategic Form Games.- 3. Eliminating the Impossible: Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational 3.3 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational and Players Know that Players Are Rational 3.4 Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge 3.5 Do people believe that people believe that people are rational? 3.6 Appendix: Strict and Weak Dominance 3.7 Appendix: Rationalizability (Advanced) 3.8 Appendix: Strict Dominance with Randomization .- 4. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three Players 4.1 Defining Nash Equilibrium 4.2 Classic Two-Player Games 4.3 The Best-Reply Method 4.4 Three-Player Games 4.5 Foundations of Nash Equilibrium 4.6 Fictitious Play and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium4.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium .- 5. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete n-Player Games 5.1 Introduction5.2 Symmetric Games 5.3 Asymmetric Games 5.4 Selecting among Nash Equilibria.- 6. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games6.1 Introduction 6.2 Solving for Nash Equilibria without Calculus 6.3 Solving for Nash Equilibria with Calculus 7. Keep 'Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies 7.1 Police Patrols and the Drug Trade 7.2 Making Decisions under Uncertainty 7.3 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium 7.4 Examples 7.5 Advanced Examples 7.6 Pessimism and Games of Pure Conflict 7.7 .- Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies.
rnPART 3 Extensive Form Gamesrn8. Taking Turns: Sequential Games with Perfect Informationrn8.1 Introductionrn8.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriumrn8.3 Examplesrn8.4 Waiting Games: Preemption and Attritionrn8.5 Do People Reason Using Backward Induction? rnrn9. Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games with Imperfect Informationrn9.1 Introduction rn9.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriumrn9.3 Examples rn9.4 Commitmentrn9.5 Forward InductionrnrnPART 4 Games of Incomplete Informationrn10. I Know Something You Don't Know: Games with Private Informationrn10.1 Introductionrn10.2 A Game of Incomplete Information: The Munich Agreementrn10.3 Bayesian Games and Bayes-Nash Equilibriumrn10.4 When All Players Have Private Information: Auctionsrn10.5 Voting on Committees and Juriesrn10.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Bayes-Nash Equilibriumrn10.7 Appendix: First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction with a Continuum of Types rnrn11. What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Gamesrn11.1 Introductionrn11.2 Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibriumrn11.3 Examplesrn11.4 Selecting Among Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibria: The Intuitive Criterionrn11.5 Appendix: Bayes's Rule and Updating Beliefsrn11.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium for Signaling Gamesrnrn12. Lies and the Lying Liars That Tell Them: Cheap Talk Gamesrn12.1 Introductionrn12.2 Communication in a Game-Theoretic Worldrn12.3 Signaling Informationrn12.4 Signaling IntentionsrnrnPART 5 Repeated Gamesrn13. Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Playersrn13.1 Trench Warfare in World War Irn13.2 Constructing a Repeated Gamern13.3 Trench Warfare: Finite Horizon rn13.4 Trench Warfare: Infinite Horizon rn13.5 Some Experimental Evidence for the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemmarn13.6 Appendix: Present Value of a Payoff Streamrn13.7 Appendix: Dynamic Programmingrnrn14. Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Playerrn14.1 Introductionrn14.2 A Menu of Punishmentsrn14.3 Quid-Pro-Quo rn14.4 Reputation rn14.5 Imperfect Monitoring and Antiballistic Missilesrnrn15. Interaction in Infinitely Lived Institutions rn15.1 Introductionsrn15.2 Cooperation with Overlapping Generationsrn15.3 Cooperation in a Large PopulationrnrnPART 6 Evolutionary Game Theoryrn16. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategiesrn16.1 Introducing Evolutionary Game Theoryrn16.2 Hawk-Dove Conflictrn16.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategyrn16.4 Properties of an ESSrn16.5 Multipopulation Games rn16.6 Evolution of Spite rnrn17. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamicsrn17.1 Introduction rn17.2 Replicator Dynamics and the Hawk-Dove Game rn17.3 General Definition of the Replicator Dynamic rn17.4 ESS and Attractors of the Replicator Dynamic rn17.5 ExamplesrnrnSolutions to "Check Your Understanding" Questions rnGlossary rnIndex
Written for majors courses in economics, business, political science, and international relations, but accessible to students across the undergraduate spectrum, Joseph Harrington's innovative textbook makes the tools and applications of game theory and strategic reasoning both fascinating and easy to understand. Each chapter focuses a specific strategic situation as a way of introducing core concepts informally at first, then more fully, with a minimum of mathematics. At the heart of the book is a diverse collection of strategic scenarios, not only from business and politics, but from history, fiction, sports, and everyday life as well. With this approach, students don't just learn clever answers to puzzles, but instead acquire genuine insights into human behavior