Meta-ethics of Values.- Moral Realism, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism and Naturalism.- Buck-passing Personal Values.- Reason and Choice.- Volitions, Comparative Value Judgments, and Choice.- The Insignificance of Choice.- Desire and Intention.- The Indeterminacy of Desire and Practical Reason.- The Myth of Objectively Alien Desires.- On the Intelligibility of Bad Acts.- After Anscombe.- Practical Reason.- The Limits of Teleology.- Motivation to the Means.- Thresholds, Vagueness and the Psychology of Small Improvements.- Freedom and Moral Agency.- Taking Liberty with Humean Necessity: Compatibilism and Contingency.- Rational Choice and Evolutionary Fit.
This volume is an edited collection of original papers on the theme of "Values, Rational Choice, and the Will". The editor is a Stanford-trained moral philosopher, and the organizer of a conference held on April 1-3, 2004. The conference succeeded in bringing together a wide range of essays that dealt with most of the central questions of moral philosophy today, in both normative ethics and meta-ethics, theoretical and applied ethics, and especially in moral psychology.
Provides the most current and extensive update on research in moral psychology
In contrast with most recent books in moral psychology, the original papers in this volume explore a wide range of topics in moral psychology, and is not just narrowly focused on a single issue
Brings together the work of established philosophers and up-and-coming philosophers, writing from several countries in North America, Europe, and Australia
Broad appeal among philosophers in the English-speaking world who teach or research in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action
For readers exploring the interdisciplinary field of moral psychology, this book provides entry points to the most important sub-disciplines in the field