Contemporary developments in philosophy have declared truth as such troublesome, and not merely gaining access to it. In a systematic survey this study investigates what is at stake when truth is given up. A historical overview shows how the current problem of truth came about, and suggests ways to overcome rather than to repair the problem.
A key issue resulting from the loss of truth is the lack of normativity. Truth provided an alternative understanding of normativity. Elaborating on the `dialectical shift' in logic, a dialogico-rhetorical understanding of normativity is presented. Rather than requiring truth, agreement, or rationality, dialogico-rhetorical normativity is the result of a balance of particular standards. This type of normativity is shaped within discussions - by advancing and accepting arguments - and is not located in sets of predetermined rules. The result is a `small' but strong form of normativity.
If this understanding of normativity is viable, one of the central problems of contemporary philosophy, the problem of incommensurability, can be seen in a different light. As a result, truth reappears again. Surviving the postmodern criticisms, it is a matter of accountability rather than of deillegalscription.
Preface. Introduction. 1. Truth; what is the problem? 2. A short history of truth and related matters. 3. From dialogue to rhetoric. 4. What is wrong with fallacies? 5. Holistic incommensurability. Conclusion. Endnotes. References. Index.
1. Truth; what is the problem?.- 2. A short history of truth and related matters.- 3. From dialogue to rhetoric.- 4. What is wrong with fallacies?.- 5. Holistic incommensurability.- Conclusion.- Endnotes.- References.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface. Introduction. 1. Truth; what is the problem? 2. A short history of truth and related matters. 3. From dialogue to rhetoric. 4. What is wrong with fallacies? 5. Holistic incommensurability. Conclusion. Endnotes. References. Index.
Klappentext
Contemporary developments in philosophy have declared truth as such troublesome, and not merely gaining access to it. In a systematic survey this study investigates what is at stake when truth is given up. A historical overview shows how the current problem of truth came about, and suggests ways to overcome rather than to repair the problem.
A key issue resulting from the loss of truth is the lack of normativity. Truth provided an alternative understanding of normativity. Elaborating on the `dialectical shift' in logic, a dialogico-rhetorical understanding of normativity is presented. Rather than requiring truth, agreement, or rationality, dialogico-rhetorical normativity is the result of a balance of particular standards. This type of normativity is shaped within discussions - by advancing and accepting arguments - and is not located in sets of predetermined rules. The result is a `small' but strong form of normativity.
If this understanding of normativity is viable, one of the central problems of contemporary philosophy, the problem of incommensurability, can be seen in a different light. As a result, truth reappears again. Surviving the postmodern criticisms, it is a matter of accountability rather than of deillegalscription.
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